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neorealist power analysis
Stefano Guzzini
The origin of this conceptual analysis lies in a basic puzzle. How did power
analysis increasingly turn from a defense to a critique of realism? I shall argue
that the turn from realism to neorealism, with its consequent reliance on
economic methodology, in fact diminished the substantial range of the original
concept of power. This article will contend that taking power analysis seriously
leads beyond neorealism.
Some recent studies by authors dissatisfied with neorealism have attempted
to widen the power concept to include what has been called structural power.
Their common claim is that the focus on strategic interaction or the bargaining
level of analysis does not capture important power phenomena. I shall argue
that these notions of structural power involve three distinct meanings, of which
only one can be shown to be compatible with the interactionist choice-
theoretical power concept that underlies the neorealist approach.
Finally, this essay claims that none of the structural power concepts is able to
provide both a comprehensive and a coherent power analysis, either because it
still omits particular power phenomena or because it overloads the concept of
power. Instead of pursuing the track of continuously widening the concept, this
article will propose a pair or dyad of concepts. The word "power" will be
reserved as an agent concept, and the term "governance" will represent effects
not due to a particular agent, whether individual or collective. More generally,
I shall use the term "power analysis" to encompass both concepts and to deal
with the link between power and international governance.
By approaching power from the methodological level, this essay presents a
more systematic analysis than those that either take the form of reviews or
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enumerations of different approaches or else do not consider the literature
beyond David Baldwin's work.1
A last preliminary remark concerns the underlying definition of neorealism
in the argument pursued here. The contribution of neorealism has been the
systematic use of an economic mode of explanation in international relations
(IR). This implies both (1) the Waltzian use of market theory and (2) the
rational-actor model used in the game-theoretical approach and most promi-
nently by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr.'s later research program. It is on
this ground that insights from the traditional realist and liberal traditions
recently have been integrated.2 The thorny question of whether Waltzian
(so-called structural) neorealism is indeed linked to a rational-choice (individ-
ualist) model has spurred a major debate.3 The position followed here is in
essence closer to that of Alexander Wendt and Richard Ashley. Martin Hollis
and Steve Smith are right that neoclassical economic theory allows, indeed
requires, a double causation at the individual and market levels. Ashley and
Wendt are also right to argue that the structural explanation presupposes the
existence and the constancy of the actor's preferences. Indeed, only by
presupposing homo economicus (Kenneth Waltz's like-unit), a being who wants
to survive in his environment (basic preference) and manages to do so by
rationally calculating the costs and benefits of alternate actions, can market
(anarchy) constraints be understood. Economic theory is very powerful
because it conceals and inextricably links these two levels. At the market level,
1. See, respectively, Richard L. Sklar, "On the Concept of Power in Political Economy," in
Dalmas H. Nelson and Richard L. Sklar, eds., Towards a Humanistic Science of Politics: Essays in
Honor of F. Dunham Wortmuth (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 179-206;
and James Caporaso and Stephen Haggard, "Power in the International Political Economy," in
Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., Power in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), pp. 99-120. David A. Baldwin's "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual
Analysis," International Organization 34 (Autumn 1980), pp. 471-506 is the last reference in
Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, eds., The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to
Concepts, Ideas and Institutions (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 322-24.
2. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited,"
International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 725-53. In particular, see p. 729, wherein
Keohane and Nye explicitly subsume liberalism and realism under a rational-actor model but with
different conceptions of the nature of environment and other actors' goals. See also Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40 (January 1988), pp. 235-51; and, explicitly,
Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in Robert Keohane, Interna-
tional Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1989), pp. 158-79. For the purpose of this argument, only the neoinstitutionalist
and regime approaches that use an economic mode of explanation can be criticized accordingly.
3. See Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism
and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 158-203; Alexander Wendt, "The
Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations," International Organization 41 (Summer
1987), pp. 337-70; Alexander Wendt, "Bridging the Theory/Metatheory Gap in International
Relations," Review of International Studies 17 (October 1991), pp. 383-92; and Martin Hollis and
Steve Smith, "Beware of the Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations," Review of
International Studies 17 (October 1991), pp. 399-403. See also the rejoinders: Alexander Wendt,
"Levels of Analysis vs. Agents and Structures: Part III," Review of International Studies 18 (April
1992), pp. 181-85; and Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, "Structure and Action: Further Comment,"
in the same issue, pp. 187-88.
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dynamics are the result of individual utilitarian value-maximizing behavior. At
the individual level, the static market constraints are the permanent back-
ground against which the strategic behavior of individuals is articulated. To
allow for the explanatory articulation of the two levels of neoclassical theory,
both individual preferences (in the macroanalysis) and the so-called invisible
working of the market (in the microanalysis) must be taken for granted
theoretically and held constant in the analysis. Without them, marginal
economics could not work. In other words, rational choice and a Waltzian
analysis are merely the two different levels of the same economic (utilitarian
and interactionist) approach.
The argument will be pursued in three steps. A first part will introduce the
methodology of this conceptual analysis and the power concept underlying
neorealism. Next, the article will analyze three meanings of structural power.
Finally, I shall propose a more coherent power analysis characterized by a dyad
of concepts.
A conceptual critique of power in neorealism
The particular analysis and criticisms of recent conceptualizations of power
proposed here call for a short justification of why at this particular moment a
new conceptual analysis of power is required. After some major methodologi-
cal assumptions regarding conceptual analyses in general have been outlined,
an appraisal of the previous power debates in IR will introduce the underlying
concept of power in neorealism.
Aims and limits of a conceptual analysis
The present analysis is not concerned with the empirical assessment of
power; rather, it proposes a conceptual analysis of power and does so in the
particular situation of a discipline in crisis. Currently, the discipline of IR is
recovering from a state of disarray exemplified by the creation of a new
discipline—namely, international political economy (IPE)—and the establish-
ment of new and legitimate research areas on the fringes of mainstream
research, such as critical theory, feminist theory, and poststructuralist ap-
proaches. At times like this, reconceptualizations are unavoidable: they
constitute the first stage in theory reconstruction. Conceptual analyses serve to
clarify and systematize the meaning of the very tools that different theories can
then use to formulate explanations. In this respect, it is essential to recall that
concepts are the basis for explanations and are not explanations as such. There
might be theories involving power that can be checked empirically, but there
are no concepts that can be checked in this way. Theories explain, concepts do
not. Thus, this conceptual analysis falls short of claiming to provide the theory
of power. The aim of this conceptual analysis is to provide a pretheoretical
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check of the coherence with which the concept of power is used in explanations
and extended in recent writings for and against neorealism. It represents a
logical control of theories before they are applied to empirical material.4
The theory dependence of the concept of power entails that there is no single
concept of power applicable to every type of explanation. This implies that a
limited range of views about power can be held that are both reasonable and
yet different, possibly even incompatible.5 At least three different reasons have
been put forward to argue for the concept of power as being "essentially
contested."
First, power always implies an element of counterfactual reasoning; that is,
the judgment of the significance of a given set of abilities (power) presupposes
an implicit statement about the unaffected state of affairs. Power implies
potential change, which in turn implies a counterfactual situation of potential
continuity. Since counterfactual situations are difficult to assess empirically, so
this argument runs, no decisive proof can be brought in favor of one approach.
Second, it has been argued that the concept of power (as related to personal
autonomy or interests) cannot be disentangled from normative discourse.6
Derived from this idea is the view in IR that "incommensurable" paradigms or
ideologies meet in an "interparadigm debate."7 Thomas Kuhn's concepts
provided a welcome explanation for the discipline's difficulties in accumulating
knowledge at a time when realism had lost its hegemony. The interparadigm
debate argued for the establishment and recognition of rival schools of thought
that cannot be subsumed under any form of revised realism. Once accepted,
however, Kuhn's concepts became a welcome protective shield used by realists
(and others) against attacks from other schools. Now, the concept of incommen-
surability legitimizes business as usual at the price of a predefined pluralism.8 A
specific historical stage of the debate in IR has become reified into rigid
categories. These categories are inherently heterogeneous and are becoming
increasingly confused with the (Anglo-American) ideological triad of conserva-
4. This is also a requisite of a strictly positivist approach that insists on the prior clarification of
the central variables and their meaning. For a classic statement, see Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of
Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (London: Free Press, 1965).
5. William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 2d ed. (Oxford: Martin Robertson,
1973), chap. 1.
6. See especially Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).
7. Michael Banks, "The Inter-paradigm Debate," in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds.,
International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-26.
For the term "ideology," in IPE, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). For an impressive list of the widely proposed
trilogies, see Volker Rittberger and Hartwig Hummel, "Die Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehun-
gen' im deutschsprachigen Raum auf der Suche nach ihrer Identitat: Entwicklung und Perspektiven"
(The discipline of 'international relations' in German-speaking countries in search of its identity:
evolution and perspectives"), in Volker Rittberger, ed., Theorien der intemationalen Beziehungen:
Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven (Theories of international relations: the state of the
art and research perspectives) (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), p. 23.
8. For this attitude, see especially K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in
International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
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tism, liberalism, and radicalism without any theoretical discussion of why
specific ideologies would require particular theories and methodologies.9
Therefore, I shall not develop a so-called realist as opposed to a so-called
liberal/pluralist or so-called critical/Marxist concept of power, assuming such
things exist. Given that concepts of power are widely used as central explanatory
variables, I find the underlying metatheoretical differences that characterize
modes of explanation to be a more fundamental level at which those concepts
can be distinguished. This third reason for essential contestability is a
constructivist approach that is arguably more Kuhnian than the interparadigm
debate. By mode of explanation, I mean the particular cluster of ontologies
(agent/structure) and epistemologies (naturalist/interpretivist) that underlie
theories and their reconstruction of reality.10 Alexander Wendt and Raymond
Duvall have written: "Although social ontologies do not directly dictate the
content of substantive theories, they do have conceptual and methodological
consequences for how theorists approach those phenomena they seek to
explain, and thus for the development of their theories."11 Concepts are not
self-sufficient. They derive their meaning more generally from their modes of
explanation and particularly from the theories (e.g., realism) in which they are
embedded.12 As will be shown, power is significantly different if conceived in an
interactionist, dispositional, or intersubjective/structuralist approach.13 This
insight, which informs the whole of the following conceptual analysis, could be
called explanatory perspectivism. It implies that concepts can be checked on
the basis of their coherence within their respective theoretical frameworks.14 It
furthermore entails that, for the purpose of this study, it makes no significant
difference who is the particular reference for power, provided the theory using
power is constructed in the same mode of explanation. For instance, interaction-
9. For more details, see Stefano Guzzini, "T. S. Kuhn and International Relations: International
Political Economy and the Inter-paradigm Debate," Master's thesis, London School of Economics
and Political Science, 1987; and Stefano Guzzini, "The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold:
Realism in International Relations/International Political Economy," EUI Working Papers SPS no.
92/20, (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, 1992), especially chaps. 10 and 16.
10. For the same metatheoretical division, see Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure
Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 36 (September 1992), pp.
245-70, and in particular p. 249.
11. Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in
Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73. The quotation is from p. 55.
12. This is now widely acknowledged across rather different conceptualizations. See, for
example, Barry Barnes, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988);
Stewart Clegg, Frameworks of Power (London: Sage Publications, 1989); Richard L. Merritt and
Dina A. Zinnes, "Alternative Indexes of National Power," in Richard J. Stoll and Michael D.
Ward, eds., Power in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1989), pp. 11-28,
and in particular p. 27.
13. I use the word "structuralist" in the traditional sense of social theory, where it refers to
theories that rely on holistic explanations. Waltz's approach has been, unfortunately for the
interdisciplinary debate, sometimes labeled structuralist. I will refer to Waltz as a neorealist.
14. For a similar approach, see Sarah Joseph, Political Theory and Power (Leiden, The
Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1988).
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ist rational-choice approaches and the power concept they include remain
basically the same in the analysis of nuclear brinkmanship, organizational
agenda-setting, or personal threats. They also remain alike across the different
spheres to which they are applied, whether economic, social, financial, or
others. Power is distinguished through its role in explanatory frameworks, not
through the fields to which it is applied.
In this way, I make two major claims. First, I try to show that concepts of
structural power rightly identify the basic paradox of recent developments in
realism. The neorealist move to an economic model will be shown to reduce the
explanatory value of the concept of power.
The second claim is a theoretical argument against what Michael Banks once
called "realism-plus-grafted-on-components," that is, the tendency of common
wisdom in IR to incorporate reasonable insights without keeping track of
whether doing so leads to an internal inconsistency.15 By criticizing already
developed power schemes in political theory, I attempt to show that the
concept of power cannot be extended indefinitely without becoming inconsis-
tent with the underlying framework of analysis. This applies, of course, to both
neorealist concepts and their challengers alike.16
The twist of the argument presented here is to make a paradox work.
Realists generally believe that whatever one can say about their story, it is a
story on power writ large. My contention is that by turning neorealist, they are
in fact restricting themselves to a limited view of power. Some realists will not
care, and the paradox will not work. Some realists might, however, hesitate and
become curious about the wisdom of sticking to or moving to a choice-
theoretical mode of explanation and its assumptions in which their central
concept is underrated. Taking power seriously might lead realists beyond
neorealism.
The neorealist concept of power
Concepts of structural power are but the latest in a series of attacks on
realism through conceptual critiques of power. The neorealist concept of
power itself reflects this long-standing debate.
According to traditional realism, the workings of the international system >
can be explained through the underlying distribution of power. This type of
analysis typically identifies the contenders, their diverging interests and
intentions, the open or tacit clash of wills, and the prevailing outcome. It shows
which of the means that have been employed have proved most efficient. This
15. Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations," in Michael Banks, ed., Conflict
in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations (Brighton, England: Harvester Press,
1984), pp. 3-21 and 18.
16. For a similar approach, see Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International
Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," International Organization 40 (Autumn
1986), pp. 753-75.
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allows the power of actors to be assessed not only for the power confrontation
in question but also for future ones. One can deduce the relative power
positions of actors by measuring the share of the most effective means they
have under their control and can then derive guidance for future policy. This
mix of explanatory and policy-planning characteristics has made the national
interest as expressed in power such a "parsimonious" and ubiquitous tool in
traditional IR.
However, this conception of power has often been held to conceal an
essentially circular argument both for the assessment of the outcome and for
the amount of power. On the one hand, it claims that (the distribution of)
power is the main criterion for the explanation of outcomes. On the other, in
some cases the outcomes are the main criterion for the assessment of power(s).
Among other critiques, this essential circularity spurred the first major
criticisms of the concept.17 As a reaction to this criticism, researchers in IR
have either carefully avoided the concept of power18 or tried to state specific
power links and measure the means more rigorously. It is in this context that we
must see two prominent reconceptualizations of power in IR, which both use a
choice-theoretical approach. This is done not by Waltz, who leaves the concept
unchanged, but by Baldwin and by Keohane and Nye.19 Baldwin attempts
systematically to apply insights from the pluralist literature in political theory to
IR.20 Keohane and Nye explore the limits of traditional power analysis in the
context of transnationalization. Even though Baldwin criticizes their use of the
concept of interdependence, these two influential reworkings of the concept
have many crucial points in common. Both approaches take a choice-
theoretical model as their underlying methodological starting point. Both are
aware of the above-mentioned tautology, which derives from defining power in
terms of resources. Both stress the importance of apprehending power
resources only after a careful contextual analysis that Keohane and Nye
subsume under "asymmetrical interdependency." Finally, both emphasize the
need to specify the context, that is, the issue-areas (and possibly also regimes)
from which "vulnerability," resources, and thus potential power derive. (For
instance, military resources are not necessarily useful when employed in a
financial context.) As a result, they propose a choice-theoretical power analysis
17. See Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," World
Politics 5 (July 1953), pp. 442-77; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New
York: Random House, 1962).
18. James Rosenau distinguishes between "capabilities" as a property concept and "control" as
actual influence over outcomes; see his 1976 essay "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent
World," in his book The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of
World Affairs (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp. 35-52.
19. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), in particular p. 18. For Baldwin's more systematic account, see the
next section of the present article.
20. For examples of the "pluralist" approach, see Robert Dahl, "Power," in David Sills, ed.,
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12,1968, pp. 405-15; and Nelson W. Polsby,
Community Power and Political Theory, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980).
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TABLE l. Meanings of structural power and related concepts
Author
Power as the production of
Indirect Unintended/ Impersonally















Hegemony in the realm of doxa
that focuses on specific "bargains" and the translation process from agent
resources, which derive from particular contexts (interdependence), via strate-
gic interaction to influence over outcomes.
Again, this new version of a realist power analysis has been found wanting. In
the following section, these critiques will be presented systematically and
criticized in turn.
Beyond neorealism? Meanings of structural power
Some recent studies have attempted to widen the power concept to include
what has been called "structural power." I shall argue that these new notions of
structural power involve three different meanings, namely, indirect institutional
power, nonintentional power, and impersonal empowering (see Table 1). Only
one of them is yet compatible with the underlying framework of neorealism,
and none is able to provide a framework for the analysis of power phenomena
that is both encompassing and coherent.
The criticisms were largely inspired by the so-called power debate in political
theory. All the stages of that debate were replayed in IR. James Caporaso's and
Stephen Krasner's concepts of structural power within IPE draw on Peter
Bacharach and Morton Baratz's "second face of power," which tried to
integrate notions like nondecision making or agenda setting. Stephen Gill and
David Law's use of structural power derives from Steven Lukes's "third
dimension" of power, which proposes to focus on the very power-intensive
situations in which conflicts of interests are systematically ruled out before they
can be voiced. Finally, Susan Strange and Richard Ashley extend power
concepts beyond the "power debate."21
21. See, respectively, Peter Bacharach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View. For
the IR analysts, see the following section.
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Power as a relational concept: indirect institutional power
as an update of neorealist power analysis
One meaning of structural power is "indirect institutional power." Krasner's
concept of metapower has to be understood as control over outcomes not via
direct confrontation but by changing the setting in which confrontation occurs.
Even though this seems to depart from the usual neorealist power analysis, a
comparison with Baldwin's framework will show that it is in fact compatible
with the assumptions of the economic approach. This concept is unsatisfactory,
however, because it is too restrictive even for an agent-based concept of power.
Krasner tries explicitly to extend his particular regime analysis to embrace a
form of power analysis. He analyzes how the regime concept can be located
within the same conversion process from resources via power to influence (over
outcomes) that we have already met in Keohane and Nye. He thus follows the
traditional realist assumption that regimes are, in the last resort, still a function
of the distribution of power and the relations among states. However, there
need not always be congruity among power distribution, regimes, and related
behavior or outcomes. In other words, there is a time lag of adjustment that
allows for a certain autonomy of the realm of norms, as well as an interactive
process between (power) base and norms.22 Therefore, lags and feedbacks
between power base and regime are the basic puzzles of Krasner's research
program. Krasner makes two points about the interaction of power and
regimes. First, he argues that changes of regimes alter the context in such a way
as to render particular resources more important for power capability than
others. The approach thereby recovers part of what one could call the
historically contingent character of power resources.23 Second, regimes can,
after a time lag, be conceived of as independent sources of influence.
However, through a shift of the argument, power and regime are not only two
different sources of influence but regime is in fact reduced to a source of power.
Krasner has defined "power" as potential control over resources and conceived
of "power resources" as those phenomena that can be used to exercise
influence. It follows that normative structures and regimes can be envisaged as
just another type of power source and their potential control as just another
form of power. Then, one could argue, Krasner's two approaches to power and
regime are fused into one. Krasner has taken this logical step by defining a
second level of power relations:
The boundaries of this work can be more clearly delineated by distinguish-
ing between two categories of political behavior. Relational power behavior
refers to efforts to maximize values within a given set of institutional struc-
tures; meta-power behavior refers to efforts to change the institutions them-
22. Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous
Variables," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 497-510, and especially p. 499.
23. For this argument, see Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Peace and war
between nations), 8th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984), p. 64.
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selves. Relational power refers to the ability to change outcomes or affect
the behavior of others within a given regime. Meta-power refers to the abil-
ity to change the rules of the game. Outcomes can be changed both by alter-
ing the resources available to individual actors and by changing the regimes
that condition action.24
Since regimes are a source of power, any intentional attempt to change regimes
or to set new institutional frames for actors' capabilities must be integrated into
power analysis. This is an indirect form of power and is often hidden or tacit.
Krasner argues his case by referring to the Third World and its attempt to
change the institutional settings in which North-South relations occur in order
to upset the relational power advantage of the North.25
This wider concept of metapower is consistent with neorealism's economic
foundations. One way to see this is to recognize the parallel between Krasner's
metapower and the power approach as developed by Baldwin, who works
explicitly with an economic exchange model like that underlying neorealism.26
Baldwin defends a so-called relational approach to the analysis of power. In
this approach, a power base or power resource cannot be assessed by sole
reference to the power holder. Baldwin's preferred example is a coercive
attempt in which a person threatens another with a gun and shouts "your
money or your life." The sanction of killing and the visible means for realizing it
generally provide a powerful threat. Yet, if the threatened person is preparing
to commit suicide, or does not value life so highly, the coercive capacity of the
threat is reduced accordingly. Awareness of this relational aspect can also be
consciously used as a defense against threats. President Harry Truman tried to
impress Joseph Stalin in Potsdam in 1945 by telling him that the United States
had developed an atomic bomb. Stalin, however, by feigning indifference,
reduced the impact of this possible bargaining chip. Thus, any power instru-
ment becomes a potential power resource only if its control is seen to be valued
24. Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 14.
For a very similar approach, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), pp.
153-71, and, in particular, pp. 166-68. Above the traditional "command power," he conceives of a
form of power, called "co-optive power" or "soft power," which (1) expressed in terms of
resources, is derived from intangible resources like the rules in regimes and cultural and/or
ideological attraction and (2) expressed in terms of power exercises, consists in structuring the
situations in which power relations occur.
25. Krasner's argument was made in the context of the U.S. and the U.K. decisions to "react"
against this attempt by quitting the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).
26. The best general presentation in political theory of the choice-theoretical approach to power
remains Brian Barry's 1975 essay, "Power: An Economic Analysis," reprinted in Brian Barry,
Democracy, Power, and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 222-69. See also Jean
Baechler, Le Pouvoir Pur (Pure power) (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1978); and Randall Bartlett,
Economics and Power: An Inquiry into Human Relations and Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989). Additionally, see Keith M. Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power
(Hants, U. K.: Edward Elgar, 1991), whose distinction between "outcome power" and "social
power" reflects exactly Krasner's twofold approach.
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by other actors in the interaction. Power comes out of this relation, not from
the power holder alone.27
Yet, the fundamental theoretical reason why Baldwin argues in favor of
power as a relational concept, and not a possession, is to resist the money-
power analogy. This approach, stemming from the social exchange literature,
treats power as a resource to be exchanged in an interaction for influence. The
rejection of this analogy marks the three major elements of Baldwin's power
analysis: the concept of fungibility,28 the multidimensional character of power,
and the prior relational analysis of specific policy-contingency frameworks.29
The high fungibility of money rests on two main characteristics: first, its high
liquidity as a medium of exchange based and dependent upon, second, its
function as a standard of value.30 Yet, for Baldwin
the owner of a political power resource, such as the means to deter atomic
attack, is likely to have difficulties converting this resource into another re-
source that would, for instance, allow his country to become the leader of
the Third World. Whereas money facilitates the exchange of one economic
resource for another, there is no standardized measure of value that serves
as medium of exchange for political power resources.31
Because power is not fungible, it is multidimensional, i.e., its scope (the
objectives of an attempt to gain influence; influence over which issue), its
domain (the target of the influence attempt), its weight (the quantity of
27. On this particular point, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 22; and his 1980 essay "Interdependence and Power: A
Conceptual Analysis" reprinted in David A. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1989), especially p. 207.
28. The term "fungibility" refers to the idea of movable goods that can be freely placed and
replaced by others of the same class. It connotes universal applicability or "convertibility" in
contrast to context specificity. For Baldwin, money is defined by its fungibility. He obviously refers
to an ideal type of money, i.e., the most liquid part of the various money aggregates, and the fact
that the standard-of-value function is fulfilled mainly in developed national economies and only to
a limited extent on the international level.
29. Keohane follows this approach when, by arguing for issue- or regime-specific analyses, he
specifically criticizes Waltz for this fungibility assumption. See Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of
World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, pp.
158-203, and especially p. 184.
30. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power, pp. 25 and 209. For a similar argument, see Arnold Wolfers,
Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 106.
Aron states that only the characteristics of money allow economists to reduce the multiplicity of
individual choices to a single scale of preferences. Since neither power nor "national interest" can
play this role, economics cannot be the model for international theory. By criticizing Kaplan, Aron
thereby anticipates and rejects Waltz's research program. Waltz explicitly acknowledges Aron's
argument. He counters by claiming that the missing standard-of-value characteristics of power is
not a problem for theory building but a practical problem that arises during its application. He
thereby overlooks Aron's argument that the reason why money is not analogous to power lies in the
lack of a theoretical analogy between utility and national interest. For the two arguments, see
Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, p. 98; and Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist
Theory," Journal of International Affairs 44 (Summer 1990), pp. 21-38, respectively.
31. David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies,"
in Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power, p. 134.
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resources), and its cost (opportunity costs of forgoing a relation) must be made
explicit. Without these qualifications, any statement about power is, for Baldwin,
close to meaningless. Another consequence of low fungibility is that power can rest
on various bases, and no single power base (military resources, for instance) can be
held a priori to be the most decisive in any attempt to exert influence.
This multidimensional character leads to the last characteristic of any power
approach in Baldwin's terms: the specification of the situation, that is, the
policy-contingency framework (see Figure 1). A relational concept of power
requires a prior contextual analysis.32 At this point, the inextricable link of the
economic approach's two levels can be shown. For the agent, this policy-
contingency framework corresponds to the structural level of an economic
approach. Only by analyzing the particular market in which (economic) actors
meet is a precise assessment of the interaction possible. In this respect,
Baldwin's multidimensional context resembles Keohane and Nye's issue-areas
or regimes rather than the general Waltzian structure. On the other hand,
agents' behavior in the long run shapes the underlying structure that constrains
future actions. It is exactly on this microeconomic dynamic of structural
theories that Krasner's approach of indirect power can be located.
In order to draw the analogy between Baldwin's and Krasner's approaches, a
last element is needed: the necessary inclusion of societal norms in the analysis.
This results from the fact that exchange is possible not only in money
economies but also in situations of barter. Indeed, in such contexts there also
exists a medium of exchange, even though it is a very crude one. Therefore, the
analogy of barter exchange and power relations is theoretically possible.33
Baldwin writes:
The exchange of approval for advice, of compliance for money, or of one
favor for another does not require measurement in terms of commensurate
units of value—at least not so long as we speak of it as direct exchange (bar-
ter). It is only when indirect exchange and the fairness of exchange are dis-
cussed that standardized measures of value begin to matter. One of the exchange
theorists' most important insights concerns the way societal norms function as
primitive measuring rods that make indirect social exchange possible.34
Thus, one not only needs a contextual analysis and a study of the historical
background but one also must be familiar with the societal background of
norms. This has the important consequence that any technological, political,
cultural, or normative development that improves the efficacy of certain
resources in affecting outcomes can, in turn, become a target for attempts to
gain influence. Therefore, two strategies are possible to improve one's
potential power in a given situation: to cause either a quantitative improvement
32. See ibid.; and Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 285.
33. Roderick Martin, The Sociology of Power (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 29.











































































































































































































































of the relevant situational power resources or a change in the environment that
defines the situationally relevant power resources. The latter is exactly what
Krasner defines as metapower. Thus, the intentional agenda-setting that
Krasner tried to integrate into realist power analysis can indeed be coherently
accounted for within the methodology used by neorealists.
Baldwin's approach (as synthesized in Figure 1) will serve as the reference
point for discussing the other two meanings of structural power.
Power as a dispositional concept: nonintentional power
and the limits of neorealist power analysis
The second distinct meaning of structural power is still conceived at the level
of agents but refers to an action's unintended (and sometimes unconscious)
effects. This meaning cannot be simply grafted onto a neorealist understanding
of power, because the latter links power to intentionality. It can be linked to a
dispositional concept of power. This section will show how the second meaning
of structural power can successfully supplement Krasner's concept. In the final
part of the article, dispositional approaches of this sort will be shown to be
unsatisfactory because their concept of structure is too limited.
Strange's work illustrates this notion of structural power as "nonintentional
power." She developed her concept in opposition to the literature of American
hegemonic decline.35 The expression of decline is chosen on purpose. One of
the theses of the hegemonic stability theory states that a declining hegemonic
power presages a declining provision of the international public good. For
Strange, the decline school is based on a fallacious inversion of this thesis,
namely, that the declining provision of international public goods would
indicate the declining power of the hegemon. She tries to show that the United
States is not unable but just unwilling to provide, or help to provide, basic
functions of a global political economy. Her concept of structural power is
crucial to pointing to the global reach of a so-called transnational empire with
the United States at its center.
She uses structural power to refer to the increasing diffusion of international
power, in both its effects and its origins, due to the increasing transnationaliza-
tion of nonterritorially linked networks. Structural power is, on the one hand, a
concept similar to Krasner's intentional metapower: the ability to shape the
security, financial, productive, and knowledge structures.36 Here, power is
35. The reference definition of hegemonic stability theory has been given by Robert Keohane,
"The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967—
1977," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the
International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131-62. Yet, it seems too much
tailored for his regime approach, neglecting the collective-good argument. For a convincing
argument, see Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International
Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614, and especially p. 581.
36. Susan Strange, "International Political Economy: The Story So Far and the Way Ahead," in
W. Ladd Hollist and F. LaMond Tullis, eds., An International Political Economy (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1985), pp. 13-25, and, in particular, p. 15.
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structural because it has an indirect diffusion via structures. On the other hand,
Strange understands power as structural because it refers to the increasingly
diffused sources and agents that contribute to the functioning of the global
political economy.37 Taken together, the provision of global functions appears
as the result of an interplay of deliberate and nonintentional influence of
decisions and nondecisions made by governments and other actors.38 To
Strange, then, the international system appears as if run by a "transnational
empire," whose exact center is difficult to locate because it is not tied to a
specific territory, but whose main base is in the United States.39 In other words,
even though actors in the United States might not always intend or be able to
control the effects of their actions, the international structures are set up in a
way that decisions in some countries are systematically tied to and affect actors
in the same and other countries.
The September 1992 crisis of the European Monetary System shows that
structural power also exists outside the United States. German reunification
led to inflation that was controlled only partly through a reversal of prior fiscal
policies. The German Bundesbank then exported the problem via higher
interest rates. These higher rates helped to trigger a speculative attack on the
British pound and the Italian lira. This, in turn, involved so much money
moving across borders that central banks quickly judged interventions to be too
costly for both the inflating DM and the deflating monetary reserves of the
attacked currencies. Thus, one basic reason for these effects is a specific policy
mix decided by the German government together with the strained social
consensus in Germany. Germany's position and sheer "weight" within the
European system gives it the privilege of avoiding some of the painful
adjustments others are facing. It manages a transnational currency as if it were
a national one.40 Yet, for particular actors, many of what appear to be purely
domestic decisions in fact significantly affect other actors, whether intention-
ally or not. Actors in Germany have a great deal of nonintentional or non-
37. For a concise presentation of recent power concepts with a similar analysis of Strange's
approach, see Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts, Le retoumement du monde: Sociologie de
la scene Internationale (The world's overturning: Sociology of the international scene) (Paris:
Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques & Dalloz, 1992), pp. 148-56.
38. See the following works by Susan Strange: "What About International Relations?" in Susan
Strange, ed., Paths to International Political Economy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp.
183-97, and especially pp. 190-91; and States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political
Economy (London: Frances Pinter, 1988), where this notion is developed most fully. For the
empirical analysis of U.S. nondecisions, see Casino Capitalism (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986),
chap. 2.
39. Susan Strange, "Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire," in Czempiel and Rosenau,
Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 161-76.
40. With regard to the management of the U.S. dollar, this critique has a longer tradition. For
one example, see Raymond Aron, Les dernieres annees du siecle (The century's last years) (Paris:
Julliard, 1984), p. 44. It is important to note that the power to avoid or to export adjustments can, in
the long run, undermine the very base of "national" power. This argument is most thoroughly made
in David P. Calleo's work; for example, see The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1982); and Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New
York: Basic Books, 1987). See also Dieter Senghaas, Friedensprojekt Europa (Peace project
Europe) (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), p. 55.
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conscious power to which all the other participants in the international game
must nevertheless adapt their behavior (typically in worst-case scenarios). Or,
to use an image of Pierre Hassner's for the description of a condominium: it
does not make any difference to the trampled grass if the elephants above it
make love or war. This structural power is underrated if one analyzes power
only in cases of specific contests in which different intentions clash.
The remaining part of this section will analyze the two implicit claims of this
form of structural power. First, it will show that economic approaches can
include the study of nonintentional effects but cannot include them in the
concept or analysis of power itself, instead referring to these effects as either
random effects or simply good or bad luck. Second, nonintentional power can,
however, be accounted for by a methodological individualist position. Strange's
approach is based not on a relational but on a dispositional concept of power.
For the exclusion of nonintentional effects from the concept and analysis of
power, we return to Baldwin's framework as the choice-theoretical reference
point. Baldwin tries to elaborate a policy-oriented, manipulative, and thus
agent-focused theory of power. Yet, his power concept has been pulled
increasingly toward a type of reasoning that focuses on outcomes and not on a
manipulative agent. In other words, Baldwin seems to be torn because of a
conceptual dilemma that is also applicable to Krasner's concept: his conceptual
approach to power expands to include all effects that influence outcomes,
whereas his actual policy analysis argues for a power concept that is limited to
the intentional agent. We could describe this in William Riker's terminology as
a dilemma in which Baldwin's aim is the study of statecraft through a
"recipelike" concept of causality (and power), while his conceptual analysis
pulls him toward a "necessary and sufficient" kind of causality.41 Whereas the
former focuses on manipulative techniques, the latter aims at a full explanation
of what affects the outcome, whether overtly or covertly. According to Baldwin,
"although Riker may be correct in asserting the superiority of the latter
concept of causality for some types of science, the former concept is more
useful in the policy sciences and will therefore be employed here."42 Yet, as
Riker says, "The more profound difficulty with recipe-causality, however, is
that it takes as fixed all relevant variables, except the manipulative one If a
non-manipulative variable in the antecedent condition does have a relation to
the effect, then it must be involved in the cause, even though recipe-causality
does not admit it."43 In his attempt to preserve power as an operationalizable
causal concept, Baldwin incorporates more and more items to account for the
exact contextual assessment of manipulative techniques; yet, he avoids provid-
41. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," in R. Bell, D. V. Edwards,
and R. H. Wagner, eds., Political Power A Reader in Theory and Practice (New York: Free Press,
1969), p. 116. The recipelike concept is defined as the production of effects through the
manipulation of nature.
42. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 26.
43. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," p. 116.
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ing the full account of the causality chain toward which this very extension pulls
his analysis. To cite Riker again:
The difference between the two kinds of causality is, like the difference
among definitions of power, a difference in orientation toward outcomes. In
recipe-like causality, the full explanation of the effect is not the problem.
Rather the problem is to explain how the effect can be made to occur. If no
manipulative technique is available, cause may be non-existent. By contrast, in
the necessary and sufficient condition kind of causality, the center of atten-
tion is on the effect rather than on manipulative techniques. Here the full
explanation of outcomes is at stake. Hence, cause cannot be non-existent,
although it can be unidentified.44
The choice of a recipe concept of power deprives the analysis of those causal
factors that cannot be linked or reduced to the agent's conscious manipulation
of the resources at hand. Power as the production of unintended effects is not
captured because it falls outside the causal link between A's intention and B's
changed behavior. The only exception that the pluralist power literature
accepts, the rule of anticipated reaction, is a case of imputed intentions, but
intentions nevertheless. Therefore, by reducing the analysis of power to the
establishment of a causal chain from A's intention to the outcome, a
choice-theoretical approach cannot theoretically incorporate the idea of power
as unintended effects into the concept of power.
This does not mean that these unintended effects are forgotten in a
choice-theoretical analysis. Riker's important point consists of showing that by
sticking to a specific mode of explanation, these unintended effects must be
dealt with either as environmental constraints or as purely random phenom-
ena. Since manipulative power entails the idea that one can change the course
of affairs, those excluded items appear as a kind of fate against which even the
most powerful actors remain powerless. The far-reaching consequence of this
apparently innocent methodological move lies on the level of political action
and responsibility. If we have to face fate, then there is nothing to do. Yet,
Strange's insistence on unintended effects attempts to show that agents could
make a difference if they wanted. Her widened concept of power aims at
shedding light on the possibilities for change and on the (political) responsibil-
ity for nonmanipulative effects that a limited concept of power must disregard.
Concepts of structural power suggest that this widening of the concept needs
to integrate a structural element into the power concept. In fact, this is not true.
One can leave intentionality out of an agent-based power concept, but it is then
necessary to relax the empiricist assumptions, the interactionist approach, and
the general causal analogy. Thus, the analytical chain starts not from an agent's
intentions but from basic actions. That this conceptualization is not just a
theoretical possibility can be shown by referring to a recent redefinition of
power in exactly these terms.
44. Ibid., p. 117; emphasis added.
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FIGURE 2. Morriss's dispositional conceptualization of power
Peter Morriss bases his analysis on a concept of power that he distinguishes
from mere influence by pointing to the profound dispositional character of
power: power, to him, refers to a capacity, ability, or dispositional property: "So
power, as a dispositional concept, is neither a thing (a resource or vehicle) nor
an event (an exercise of power): it is a capacity. "45 Since power is defined as an
ability, every basic action, controlled by will, at the disposal of an actor can be
considered as power. The capacity to influence by will is thus a criterion to
distinguish power from a (dispositional) property.
Morriss goes on to distinguish, as shown in Figure 2, three categories of
45. Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University
Press, 1987), p. 19; emphasis original. On pages 15-18, Morriss criticizes the pluralists for their
excessive empiricism in requiring the actual exercise of power as a condition for its existence. He
calls this the "event-fallacy." For a discussion of both fallacies in IR and IPE, see Daniel Garst,
"Thucydides and Neorealism," International Studies Quarterly 33 (March 1989), pp. 3-27, and, in
particular, pp. 20-22.
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ability.46 Since this conceptualization of power is based on "effecting," Morriss
disposes also of a category for nonintentional power. "Nonepistemic" abilities
are those that are effected in an uncontrolled way, such as when agents are
unaware of their capacities and their consequences or they choose the wrong
basic action for the intended outcome. This category is able to take account of
Strange's idea of nonintentional power, which looks at power from the
"receiving side." Morriss shows that whenever "we want to work out what
people might do to us, it is non-epistemic power we are concerned with."47
This stress on mere capacities and not their exercise seems at first hand close
to the traditional power analyses in IR. The important difference is that those
approaches posited a direct link between the control of outcomes and
capacities, whether they are implemented or not. Strange's structural power
looks at power from the point of view of the diffused power effects and stresses
the uncontrolled consequences of power actions.48
The major difference of such a dispositional approach from an interactionist
rational-choice approach is that these consequences are part of the power
assessment and are not just random. This contradicts approaches like Klaus
Knorr's, for instance, who explicitly and coherently refuses to accept such a
form of nonintentional power. Knorr dismisses Francois Perroux's concept of
dominance, which is close to Strange's structural power, as purely incidental
and therefore irrelevant for power analysis.49 This exclusion of nonintentional-
ity privileges the manipulative actor's (or power holder's) view and leaves the
analysis of power with a specific blind spot, namely, the tacit power of the
strong. If neorealism goes on following this route, it is to be expected that
criticisms of the kind implicit in different structural power concepts will
continually reappear. Hence Baldwin acknowledges, without further discus-
sion, that "concepts of power that allow for the possibility of unintended
influence may be more useful to the student of dependency and autonomy than
other power concepts."50
Power as a structural/intersubjective concept:
impersonal power
The last of the three meanings of structural power and related concepts can
be generically described as "impersonal power" because the origin of the
46. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 54.
47. Ibid, p. 54.
48. Coming to the second side of her power approach, the diffusion not of the effects but of the
origins of power, Strange does, however, individualize a privileged actor, the "international
business civilization." In other words, nonintentional power is very unevenly distributed through-
out the international power structure. See Susan Strange, "The Name of the Game," in N.
Ritopoulos, ed., Sea-changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed (New York: Council
of Foreign Relations Press, 1990), pp. 238-74.
49. Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (London:
Macmillan, 1973), pp. 77-78.
50. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power," p. 205.
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produced effect is not located at the level of actors. Here, two different
conceptualizations can be distinguished. The first could be described as a
positional concept that focuses on the impersonal bias of international
relations, which systematically gives an advantage to certain actors due to their
specific positions or roles in the international system. The second stresses the
link between knowledge and power, arguing that power requires prior
intersubjective recognition. Both approaches explicitly attempt to abandon the
underlying choice-theoretical mode of explanation. These concepts, too, are
unsatisfactory because they tend to overload and thus render incoherent the
single concept of power. This section will present the two approaches; the next
section takes their insufficiencies as the basis for developing a different power
analysis derived from a dyad of concepts.
The first more positional approach to power has been introduced by James
Caporaso. He accepts the centrality of power, yet gives it a double twist in order
to incorporate the link between the global political economy and less
developed countries' economic and political development. The focus on
"bargaining power in asymmetrical interdependence" is considered insuffi-
cient.51 He acknowledges that dependence is, on the bargaining level, no
criterion for a qualitative differentiation of less developed countries.52 Yet, he
integrates the "second face" of power, derived from Bacharach and Baratz, to
save a concept of dependency. This is called structural power. Implicitly, he
also repeats an ambiguity that can be found in the work of Bacharach and
Baratz.53 Their nondecision making can mean both the inherent bias of any
organization that benefits some more than others (nondecisions as "structural
bias") and the conscious manipulation of the bias to affect outcomes in an
advantageous way (nondecisions as "antedecisions"). Caporaso refers to the
latter in his definition of structural power as "the ability to manipulate the
choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities, and pay-offs that actors may
utilize."54 This is in line with Krasner's concept of metapower. Yet, he also
speaks of "the social structuring of agendas [that] might systematically favor
certain parties," which is definitely an impersonal concept.55
51. James A. Caporaso, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Dependence and Dependency in
the Global System," and "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A
Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 1-12 and
13-43, respectively. The quotations are from pages 4 and 28 and allude, of course, to Keohane and
Nye's Power and Interdependence.
52. Ibid., pp. 2 and 18. This point has been most elegantly made by Sanjaya Lall, "Is
'Dependence' a Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?" World Development 3 (Novem-
ber-December 1975), pp. 799-810.
53. This ambiguity has been largely neglected in the literature. For an exception, see Geoffrey
Debnam, The Analysis of Power: A Realist Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 24.
54. Caporaso, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Dependence and Dependency in the Global
System," p. 4.
55. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System," p. 33. In more
recent writings, Caporaso retreats slightly from this latter position. He retains the basic division
between relational (agent-based) and structural power approaches. Yet, together with Stephen
Haggard, he now concludes that these forms of power are not necessarily competing categories:
Structural power 463
In a similar vein, Gill and Law try to overcome the dominant behavioral
power paradigm in IR and IPE by a concept of structural power that is said to
capture better the indirect forms of power.56 Explicitly following Lukes, they
begin by distinguishing three dimensions of power: overt, covert, and structur-
al.57 Later, they introduce a direct/indirect distinction. Although they are not
explicit, they seem to rely on individual action as the distinctive criterion. Thus,
overt and covert power are linked to agents' decisions and nondecisions in
pursuing their interests, whereas structural power refers to "material and
normative aspects, such that patterns of incentives and constraints are
systematically created."58
Their "impersonal material setting" is nearly synonymous with the function-
ing of markets. Through markets, the structural power of capital is exercised.59
The state-market nexus becomes the very center of the analysis.60 Gill and Law
focus on the relationship between the political organization of the global
political economy into nation-states and the power of capital. On the one hand,
international anarchy enhances capital's bargaining position, allowing it to play
one country against another; on the other hand, national sovereignty can
reduce capital's power through statist intervention, such as welfarism, mercan-
tilism, and the public sector. The absence of a world government is as much a
structural prerequisite for the power of capital as a limitation to the potentially
global reach of market-economic activities. Hence, in the material part of their
approach, the logic of the market overtakes the balance of power or regimes as
the central and slightly mechanistic explanatory variable, which provides the
basic causality and predictive virtue.61
However, Gill and Law also stress a second, normative aspect of structural
power/hegemony. This is the basic link between structural power and Antonio
Gramsci's analysis of hegemony, which, following the work of Robert Cox, they
they both refer to (different kinds) of resources that affect outcomes understood as bargains (see
their "Power in the International Political Economy"). For a critique of this argument, see the
third part of this article.
56. See in particular two works by Stephen Gill and David Law: The Global Political Economy
(New York: Harvester, 1988); and "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital,"
International Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989), pp. 475-99.
57. For a similar account, based on Steven Lukes's three dimensions, see Keith Krause,
"Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships,"
International Studies Quarterly 35 (September 1991), pp. 313-36.
58. Gill and Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 73.
59. For the definition of capital, see Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power
of Capital," pp. 480-81. Note that the terms "power of markets" and "structural power" are
sometimes used interchangeably; see Gill and Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 97.
60. The state-market nexus "politicizes" (in an Eastonian way) international economic
relations. The analysis is centered around the two competing authoritative allocation mechanisms
(for values or resources) that exist: states and markets. See Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Internationale
Politik: Ein Konfliktmodell (International politics: A conflict model) (Paderborn, Germany:
Schoningh, 1981); and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Internationalizing Politics: Some Answers to the
Question of Who Does What to Whom," in Czempiel and Rosenau, Global Changes and
Theoretical Challenges, pp. 117-34.
61. Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," p. 485.
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want to transfer to the international level. True, no realist would dispute the
derivation of norms from power relations, the conservative bias of law in the
hands of the ruling group, the importance of the normative setting for specific
historic global political economies (regimes of accumulation), or, finally, the
anticipated ruling of power where its overt demonstration is not needed.62
However, the Gramscian approach derives the ruling ideology from a class
analysis, that is, from the sphere of production.63 It goes beyond crude
materialism by pointing to the fact that the ruling elite can co-opt part of the
ruled into a "historic bloc," which makes orthodox revolutionary politics
impossible. The research program of this power approach consists of finding
the new transnational historical bloc and the way its (neoliberal) discourse and
practice suborn dependent classes and preempt their opposition.
This latter point, in particular the consensual aspect of power, has been
developed by Ashley in the second impersonal conceptualization of power as
power/knowledge. The consensual aspect is traditionally handled through the
concept of legitimacy that, in the usual reading of Max Weber, distinguishes
between power (Macht) and authority/rule {Herrschaft). Herrschaft requires
legitimacy, that is, a form of internal acceptance by the power addressees.64 The
poststructuralist twist can be seen in the metatheoretical location of phenom-
ena of power. This means that consensus is conceptualized not only in an
agent's recognition but also as produced and reproduced outcomes of rituals
and discourses that are not intentionally effected by particular actors. Legiti-
macy understood as the result of a social contract is an insufficient concept to
account comprehensively for consensus and governance.65 In this formulation,
the consensual aspect of power entails, but means certainly something more
than, a shift of focus to a kind of Weberian approach wrapped in a Gramscian
blanket.66 This approach has, then, its specificity not only in the actual meaning
62. On the first point, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf,
1947), pp. 342ff; and on the second, see Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force,
and the Balance of Power," reprinted in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign
Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 304-14, at p. 309. Note in
this context Antonio Gramsci's interest in the Italian Realist tradition (Niccolo Machiavelli,
Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto) in Antonio Gramsci, Noterelle sulla politico del Machiavelli:
Quaderno 13 (Notes on Machiavelli's politics: Notebook 13) (Turin: Einaudi, 1981).
63. Cox insists on the rooting of hegemony in social forces, to avoid repeating Machiavelli; see
Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method," Millennium
12 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-75, and especially p. 164.
64. Norberto Bobbio, "La teoria dello stato e del potere" (The theory of the state and of power),
in Pietro Rossi, ed., Max Weber e Vanalisi del mondo (Max Weber and the analysis of the world)
(Turin: Einaudi, 1981), pp. 215-46, and, in particular, p. 226.
65. Michel Foucault, "Corso del 14 gennaio 1976," in Michel Foucault, Microfisica del Potere:
Interventi Politici (The microphysics of power: Political interventions) (Turin: Einaudi, 1977), p.
188.
66. For the stress on Herrschaft, see Ulrich Albrecht, Internationale Politik: Einfuhrung in das
System internationaler Herrschaft (International politics: Introduction into the system of interna-
tional rule) (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986). For the Gramscian wording, see Bradley S. Klein,
"Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Policies,"
Review of International Studies 14 (April 1988), pp. 133-48, and, in particular, p. 134.
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given to power but also in the realm to which it is applied. It does not analyze
power in IR and IPE as reflected in its discourse but the power o/precisely this
discourse. The poststructuralist critique aims at that level at which such power
practices are concealed, that is, the metatheoretical level which underlies
realist analysis and consequently its deliberate policies.67 The realist discourse
is attacked as a power practice itself.
Ashley expands what one could call a "communicative" approach68 to a
Foucauldian genealogical power conceptualization. His genealogical attitude
can be summarized as an attempt to reveal the power practices that bind,
conquer, and administer social space and time, that is, the emergence of
"disciplines."69
Crucial for this understanding of power is a specific concept of practices that
includes not only interactive influence attempts but also rites, routines, and
discourses. Thereby one disposes of an intersubjective level of analysis different
from an objectified or even determinist structure as well as from an intentional
agent. Rites and routines are not just a constraint or a resource for agents; they
also empower agents. In this approach it makes sense to speak of the power of
rites. According to David Kertzer, "The power of the rite is based in good part
on the potency of its symbols and its social context People's emotional
involvement in political rites is certainly a key source of their power."70
There are two ways in which rites can be linked to power. First, they can
obviously be used as a means or source of an intentional influence attempt. A
recent example is the Western propaganda that modeled Saddam Hussein as a
modern Adolf Hitler. The "powerful" analogy constituted a means to stimulate
widespread approval of U.S. foreign policy in those European circles that
usually are rather critical of it. Second, rites can also empower agents. In this
case, the power of rites is impersonal, because it does not originate in an actor.
But at the same time, it is not objective or natural—like the power of
hurricanes, for instance—because rites are not powerful independent of
agents. The symbol of Munich can be intentionally invoked by actors, but it
keeps a particular hold on Western political discourse and thus also on
policymaking since 1938. Its power is constantly renewed or shaken by more
recent applications. The rallying power of a national flag can be used by
politicians, but the symbol escapes their control; it "governs" independently of
67. The most radical power critique at the metatheoretical level is the poststructuralist branch of
feminism. See Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, "The Radical Future of Realism:
Feminist Subversions of IR Theory," Alternatives 16 (Winter 1991), pp. 67-106, and, in particular,
pp. 75-76 and 97-98.
68. See Richard Little, "Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought,"
Review of International Studies 15 (April 1989), pp. 87-100; and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Regimes,
Interpretation, and the 'Science' of Politics," Millennium 17 (Summer 1988), pp. 263-84, and
especially p. 272.
69. Richard Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of
International Politics," Alternatives 12 (October 1987), pp. 403-34, and especially p. 418.
70. David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1988), pp. 179 and 180.
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particular intentions, albeit not independently of the practices and the meaning
given to it by the group of actors involved.
Ashley derives such a form of impersonal power from the work of Pierre
Bourdieu. Fundamental here is Ashley's introduction of Bourdieu's concept of
"doxa." Bourdieu distinguished doxa both from orthodoxy (a kind of estab-
lished truth or common wisdom) and from heterodoxy (orthodoxy's official
contender). The two latter concepts refer to the universe of open discourse and
argument and depend on each other. Doxa, on the other hand, refers to the
self-evident background of the established order on which the contest between
orthodoxy and heterodoxy is articulated. Even though the realm of doxa is
necessary to set the stage, its contingency is not acknowledged: "Every
established order tends to produce the naturalization of its own arbitrariness."
Writes Bourdieu:
In the extreme case, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspon-
dence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organi-
zation (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-
evident. This experience we shall call doxa. ... The instruments of
knowledge of the world are in this case (objectively) political instruments
which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing im-
mediate adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of
which they are the product and of which they reproduce the structures in a
transformed form The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political
theory because the specific symbolic power to impose the principles of the
construction of reality—in particular, social reality, is a major dimension of
political power.71
The domain of doxa represents a system of normalized recognition through
continuous practice that ceases to work (and incidentally also to exist) exactly
at the moment when conscious legitimation is needed. Thus, Ashley locates
impersonal empowering explicitly at an intersubjective level, where knowledge
is constituted and acting and thinking space defined. There roles and practices
are constructed, and they then operate systematically and nonintentionally,
that is "naturally," not only to exclude issues from the agenda but also to
prevent the very definition of such issues and their possible solutions. Ashley
writes that "the political power of hegemony... is neither a 'power over' other
actors nor a 'power to' obtain some consciously deliberated future end among
ends. The power of hegemony resides precisely in the capacity to inhabit a
domain of doxa and to competently perform the rituals of power naturalized
therein."72
We can use a critique of neorealism as an illustration of Ashley's "dissident"
71. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977), pp. 164 and 165.
72. Richard Ashley, "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance,"
in Czempiel and Rosenau, Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 251-90, and, in
particular, p. 269.
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power analysis. The latter would attempt to counter the closing-off procedures
that the move toward neorealism "effected" in the face of the increasing
dissolution of the discipline's boundaries in the 1970s. The qualitative
difference between international and domestic politics, that is, anarchy and
sovereignty, already had been attacked by the older behavioral claim that
methodologically the study of internal and external policies is alike, by the
rising importance of transnational actors that undermine the concept of
sovereignty, and by bureaucratic politics that question the notion of a unified or
rational actor. Waltz's reformulation of realism restored the categorical
dichotomy and thus provided the discipline with a defining boundary. Waltz's
defense comprised the off-loading of transnational and infranational phenom-
ena into the area of foreign policy analysis (hence political science), thus
preserving a systemic realism. Its effect, or its power, derived from its ability to
rescue IR as a respectable and legitimate discipline—respectable through its
commitment to economic methodology and legitimate because it could not be
"reduced" to any other field in the social sciences' division of labor. Waltz's
neorealism was so "powerful" not because its parsimonious balance-of-power
theory could uncover more things about the real world than we knew before but
because it mobilized the scientific community's longing for a paradigmatic core.
By preempting specific heterodox views, Waltz's discourse prepared the ground
on which the legitimate debate of the discipline between neorealism and
neoinstitutionalism could take place. In other words, it did not provide a
convincing answer to the anomalies of the discipline, but it was successful in
mobilizing established conceptions of the legitimate way to approach them.73
Consequently, this strong metatheoretical outlook of poststructuralism is at
once the historical symptom of a discipline in crisis and the necessary outlook
of an explanatory framework that seeks to disclose knowledge trapped in the
positivist rational-choice discourse of neorealism.
Since the authors of this third meaning of structural power have themselves
departed explicitly from the choice-theoretical basis of neorealism, what is at
issue here is not whether these structural approaches of power can be
integrated into neorealism; rather it is whether they are internally coherent and
whether their insights are necessarily linked to a power analysis.
A power analysis with a dyad of concepts
This final section deals with the fallacies inherent in possible overextensions of
the concept of power and proposes a solution that distinguishes between two
concepts, power and governance, that must be put together in a comprehensive
power analysis.
73. See Kenneth Waltz's works, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979); and especially "A Response to My Critics," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics,
pp. 322-45. In the latter work, Waltz does not respond to the move to the metatheoretical level on
which Ashley's critique is pitched.
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Overload fallacies of structural power
The three following fallacies illustrate the impossibility of limiting power
phenomena to a single concept at either the agent or the structural level. The
first fallacy is trying to extend an agent concept to cover all power phenomena.
This problem is linked to the concept of human agency itself. Following Dennis
Wrong, the fallacy consists of not distinguishing between intentional and
nonintentional action. By failing to make this distinction (and by not reserving
the exercise of power for intentional and responsible action), one inevitably
makes the effect of power coincide with human action. For this reason Wrong
limits the concept of power to the capacity to produce intended effects
including unintended, but foreseen side effects.74 Unforeseen effects are
considered important for any analysis in social science and part of a more
general concept of influence but are not generally considered relevant to the
concept of power as such. Yet, foresight does not seem to be a good criterion
for the distinction of power relations from general agency because it would
result in giving too much emphasis to the viewpoint of those who exercise
power as opposed to those who have to bear its consequences.75 Morriss's
argument remains valid at this point; if one conceives of power as a way of
"effecting," as Wrong also does, then unintended effects must be included.76
Thus, the initial problem remains: how to avoid collapsing all power
phenomena into agency? Lukes, aware of this difficulty and the shortcomings of
intentionalist approaches, starts by saying that the "effecting" must be
considered significant for a particular reason (and is therefore contestable).
His distinctive criterion is not intention and its link to responsibility but
"interest furthering."
Yet, this approach points to the second possible fallacy of structural power as
impersonal empowering: pluralists refuse it because it would entail the
"power-as-benefit fallacy." Deducing power from positive effects produces the
anomaly of the free rider, whose interests are furthered by the system but who
remains nevertheless at its mercy. It seems odd to describe the free rider as
necessarily powerful.77
Even more carefully developed individualist approaches suffer from this
74. Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
pp. 3-5.
75. J. M. Barbalet, "Power, Structural Resources, and Agency," Current Perspectives in Social
Theory, vol. 8,1987, pp. 1-24, and, in particular, p. 6.
76. One of the reasons for the reluctance to incorporate nonintentional power is the relationship
between the concepts of power and responsibility in agent-oriented theories. It seems, however, to
be going too far to conclude that since it is difficult to assess responsibility in cases where
unintended effects have been produced, such effects must necessarily be excluded from power
analyses. The extent of responsibility must be judged case by case. For both the intended and
unintended consequences of action, the capacity to effect an outcome (i.e., power) is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for an actor's responsibility.
77. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, p. 208.
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shortcoming. Morriss, for instance, explicitly attempts to include such imperson-
ally produced effects. For this purpose, he introduces the notion of passive
power to account for the cases where we "don't want to differentiate between
people who do get something and people who can get it, but we want to
distinguish these people from those who cannot get it." Morriss then defines
passive power as being "passive in both senses: no choice is involved because
you could not intervene to prevent the outcome occurring; it would come about
in spite of anything you might do."78 This illustrates the "benefit fallacy":
deduce power from rewards.79 Morriss accepts the charge, yet considers it
beside the point:
There is no need to claim that because someone benefits she must cause
her good fortune, nor that she can control it. All one need do is note that a
status quo that systematically benefits certain people (as Polsby agrees it
does) is relevant in itself. .. . Yet if the social system performs in such a way
as systematically to advantage some individuals or groups, it certainly seems
odd not to take account of this.80
I agree that it would be a great mistake in an empirical analysis of a specific
outcome to neglect how the structural bias on the normative, institutional, or
economic level affects the very way power relations are built up, conceived,
understood, and decided. But why must we take account of it by integrating it
into the concept of power as such, especially if we refuse, as Morriss does, the
argument of power as a subcategory of cause? Impersonal effect or structural
bias may be part of any power analysis, but it cannot be part of the concept of
power if the latter is actor-based, as in the case of the pluralists' relational
conception or Morriss's dispositional one.
The third fallacy represents a mirror image of the first one, namely, a form of
structural reductionism. All the approaches considered so far take into account
the policy-contingency framework, or whatever the authors prefer to call the
contextual part of their analyses. The notion of impersonal power seems to
require a founding outside the agent, not within the person's intention (in the
narrow behavioral approach) or action (in the wider individualist approach).
This has provoked major critiques. By not sufficiently stressing the fundamental
agent reference of power, the criticism runs, the concept of power becomes
either synonymous with structural constraint, thus rendering structural power a
contradiction in terms, or else it becomes a rather amorphous all-encompassing
concept like social control.81
This critique stems from writers whose concept of power rests on a rather
78. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 100. In both quotations the emphasis is original.
79. Brian Barry, "The Uses o f Power,' " in Barry, Democracy, Power, and Justice, p. 315.
80. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, pp. 105-6.
81. For the first charge, see Steven Lukes, Essays in Social Theory (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977), p. 9; and for the second, see Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses, p.
252.
470 International Organization
strong concept of agency, as, for instance, in the agency assumptions of
rational-choice theories (desires, beliefs, preferences, rationality, choices) or,
in a different vein, as in the case of Lukes, for whom power becomes attached to
personal autonomy and the moral discourse of freedom and justice. Both
approaches retain, on the other hand, a very thin concept of structure.
Obviously, if structures are just seen as constraints, then structural power is a
contradiction in terms. But this is due not to a supposedly inherent agency
reference for power phenomena but to an insufficient conceptualization of
structures.
The solution must include an idea of structures as not constraining, but
enabling or facilitating. In one attempt to rescue a concept of structural power
that is not a contradiction in terms, Hugh Ward distinguishes between power
derived from two different kinds of resources.82 Some resources are personal in
the sense that they activate individual-specific relations. Other resources,
however, are due to a general setting that makes no distinction among agents
from within the same category. These structural resources enable actors or
facilitate their actions. They thus differ from personal resources, and control
over them can be called, as Ward suggests, structural power.
This reconceptualization of structure is still unsatisfactory. Ward uses the
perfect market as his model. The market model can account for the enabling
feature of structures only through the provision of resources that agents can
use to alter their abilities. The assumption of perfect competition never calls
into question the origin and maintenance, that is, the reproduction of market
positions. The strength of economic analysis is its understanding of the market
dynamics of the established actors. It is still not convincing for the explanation
of growth, economic development, or the dynamics of creating competitive
advantages. Yet, once one accepts that structures are inherently biased for this
reason and tend to reproduce such biases, it becomes clear that one must
conceive structures more dynamically. One must in fact expand the small
structuralist account of a logic of the market not reducible to agency to one of
markets as institutions that work with and through a specific set of intersubjec-
tive rules and practices. These structures constitute power practices that are
continually allocating and reallocating agents to categories that are differently
affected by the working of the bias. After all, not everyone is, say, an employer,
and not everyone can or is empowered to be one. Whereas agent concepts are
compelled simply to treat this as fate, structural constraint, or (poor) luck, it
seems more reasonable to set up a power analysis in which empirical scrutiny
determines whether it is in fact a question of luck or power.
Thus, whereas Morriss's solution, passive power, was questionable due to its
attempt to integrate bias into the concept of power, Ward's proposal is
82. Hugh Ward, "Structural Power—A Contradiction in Terms?" Political Studies 35 (Decem-
ber 1987), pp. 593-610.
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insufficient because it leaves the systematic furthering of specific interests out
of the entire power analysis by reducing impersonal empowering to the control
of preexisting structural resources.
Power analysis including agent power and impersonal
governance
There is a seemingly easy theoretical solution to this problem. Not one, but
two concepts are necessary to account for the range of power phenomena,
namely, (agent) power and governance. This solution avoids concealing the
agent-structure tension within the concept, as Morriss does, or reducing
empowering to an objective and general constraint/opportunity, as happens
with Ward. This implies a shift away from an economic to an intersubjective
and constructivist approach, but the substantial problem of the agent-structure
divide remains.
The choice of using "power" as the agent referent of power phenomena and
"governance" as the intersubjective referent is conventional. One could have
chosen either to use another set of words or to follow Michel Foucault and
reserve the concept of power for the impersonal part of power phenomena.83 My
decision is to follow more common (English-language) usage and reserve the
concept of power for the agent level. In such cases, power concepts have often been
accompanied by more impersonal concepts taken from the family of authority.84
This dyad of concepts needs a particular theory of agency and structure.
With regard to agent power, it requires a dispositional conceptualization of
power as a capacity for effecting, that is, transforming resources, which affects
social relationships.85 Using power as a dispositional concept can account for
the first two meanings of structural power.
Governance can then be defined as the capacity of intersubjective practices
to effect. This includes both the social construction of options that is at the
heart of the Gramscian analysis and the routine mobilizing of bias that affects
social relationships, more present in poststructuralist writings. For all their
differences, they both conceive cooperation as more than a phenomenon of an
instrumentalist relation, where one looks for the best way to "cooperate under
anarchy" or where the regimes, as an outcome of this instrumentalist
83. The French language distinguishes between puissance (Latin potentia) and pouvoir (Latin
potestas), where the first term refers to a potential or ability and the second, to an act. Moreover, a
third term, Pouvoir, is used to denote centralized power or government. Foucault's insistence on
the diffusion of power is explicable as a countermove to a traditional conception of sovereign (i.e.,
centralized) power.
84. See especially Steven Lukes, "Power and Authority," in T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, eds.,/1
History of Sociological Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 633-76.
85. For a recent and similar definition of power, see Heikki Patomaki, "Concepts of 'Action,'
'Structure,' and 'Power' in 'Critical Social Realism': A Positive and Reconstructive Critique,"
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 21, no. 2,1991, pp. 221-50, at p. 234.
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cooperation, influence the brute clash of forces beyond the resulting invisible
hand of the balance of power. Order is conceived of not only as the result of
individual forces of will but also as the prior constitution of these forces. The
structured international realm is also always a form of society/order/system in
which agents are constituted—and not just the other way around. This could be
exemplified by the way international discourse on development and its agencies
have constructed the particular problematique of development and the
so-called Third Worlder who needs to be developed.86 It is then under this
recognized identity that these agents are either empowered or disempowered
to take part in international relations.
Poststructuralists would insist that governance for this reason is not
necessarily something material to be attached to some persons and not to
others, but a diffused process passing through agents.87 It is reproduced and
realized via practices, habits, dispositions, and sometimes even through the
construction of the agent's identity (see Figure 3). Therefore, one must resist
the attempt to invariably "individualize" the origins of power, the genesis of the
produced effects. This individualization—necessary for blaming agents—
begins to appear deceptive when one analyzes governance. There the discourse
of individual blame is simply misplaced.88
Allowing for a wide approach to power phenomena does not, however, entail
acceptance of all the power approaches presented above. The proposed
solution explicitly excludes power analyses that argue for a restriction to an
agent-based power concept, for they are compelled to avoid the power-as-
benefit fallacy by introducing not a second concept of the power family but a
random concept: luck. Keith Dowding's rational-choice approach to power has
gone so far as to acknowledge the systematic interest furthering that pushed
Morriss to conceive of passive power. Quite consistently, he must then treat it
as "systematic luck." This concept refers to the privileges and advantages that
stem from the social positions of specific actors, but for which they apparently
did nothing.89 By reducing systematic bias to a question of luck, this approach
leaves out of the picture the daily practices of agents that help to reproduce the
very system and positions from which the advantages of the lucky are derived.
This means that social reproduction can be understood as a ritual of power that
not only rests on those who benefit from the system but also needs all those
who, via their conscious or unconscious practices, help to sustain it. There is no
86. Marc DuBois, "The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power
Relations in Development," Alternatives 16 (Winter 1991), pp. 1-30.
87. This applies for both of Foucault's later periods. For the 1970s, see Michel Foucault,
Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Discipline and punishment: The birth of the prison)
(Paris: Gallimard, 1975), pp. 31-34; and for the 1980s, James Bernauer and David Rasmussen,
eds., The Final Foucault (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), particularly pp. 18-20.
88. For a critique of this unwelcome "interference of conspiracy theory," see Ole Wasver,
"Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: A Post-Ashleyan Position," Working
paper no. 24/1989 (Copenhagen: Center for Conflict and Peace Research, 1989), p. 23.



























































































































































































































prime mover. Power lies both in the relational interaction of agents and in the
systematic rule that results from the consequences of their actions. To quote
Foucault, "People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what
they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does."90 Routine actions
can constitute rituals of power that suggest the realm of the possible. They
construct (and deconstruct) the horizon of the thinkable and feasible that
continuously enframes agency and preempts or co-opts alternative discourses
and practices.
Power analysis, as the comprehensive account of power phenomena, must
call into question the relationship between the different forms of power and of
governance. By focusing on power, one needs, for instance, to integrate an
analysis of governance via the social patterning of structures. Social interac-
tions mobilize rules for agenda setting that privilege specific agents, that is, the
agent's actual power in a bargain is fostered by the system's governance. This is
done neither through direct bargaining nor via indirect institutional agenda
setting. Only in this way can the power of the German Bundesbank in the
above-mentioned example be fully understood. Thus, with a dyad of concepts
one can account for Strange's concept of structural power, which she sees as
more than the "power to set the agenda of discussion or to design (in American
phraseology) the international 'regime' of rules and customs."91
On the other hand, by focusing on governance, one needs to conceptualize
power via the way the identities of agents are constantly redefined. This
Foucauldian theme about the intersubjective constitution of agency might
appear farfetched in times of stability. Yet, in periods of apparent transition
and of an elusive agent and power, Foucault's ideas might be particularly
interesting. Just as in Foucault's research program about the constitution of the
modern self, so, in international theory, there is a research program about
contemporary agency. Moreover, it seems that (1) the constitution of firms,
individuals, and nations (not states), for example, as international agents, (2)
their definition, and (3) their recognition are resisted by the (realist) interna-
tional community. Neorealism's inherent conservative bias can at times be
healthy but is more and more resented as a disciplinary ritual whose effect
consists of marginalizing alternative thought and politics. In other words, in
times of an "international" apparently in transition, the theory most resistant
to the analysis of change predicts as most probable an eternal return of
anarchy. It thereby counters the constitution of recognized international
agency and, thus, the latter's power. An analysis of this doxic power of
neorealism can identify this discourse and its bearers (academics and states-
men) and can bring them under a general power analysis.
90. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Herme-
neutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 187.
91. Susan Strange, "The Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization 41 (Autumn
1987), pp. 551-74. The quotation is from p. 565.
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Consequences for the study of power phenomena
in contemporary IR and IPE
This reconceptualization of power and governance substantiates already
existing critiques of neorealism. Via a conceptual analysis of power that
integrates power and governance, neorealism's lack of historicity and its
consequent legitimation of status quo power relations can be exposed.
To illustrate the first point, let us again take Krasner's concept of meta-
power. Krasner conceptualizes regimes as an influence on outcomes, that is, as
something linked to the power base, but with a lag. In this way, he used regimes
and normative structures as possible resources of power and their potential
control as a form of power, namely, metapower. In this context the normative
structure becomes an object, similar to material sources, on which to dwell.92
This reduction of regimes to objects makes it possible to analyze the structural
environment as a set of given constraints and opportunities and not as
something that is being continually reshaped by the historically constituted and
intersubjectively reproduced societal biases.
In a similar vein, Waltz's formulation practically rules out change at the
structural level. By limiting structural change to the first level (anarchy versus
hierarchy) and by defining anarchy as the lack of international government, the
model constructs a thinking space for change in only one direction. There is
change if and only if power becomes concentrated in the hands of one actor and
if and only if this hegemony produces a unique sovereignty. This leaves
untouched the constitution of the realm we take for granted as international
and its significant changes.93 However, as the preceding discussion has shown,
to account for governance requires a focus on the social construction of such
relations and, indeed, of the identity of the relevant actors.94 Thus, a dyadic
power analysis will inevitably problematize the basic anarchy/sovereignty on
which neorealism is built.95 In response to Waltz's poor account of change,
recent works have tried to integrate change at the second tier of Waltz's
neorealism.96 Yet, as long as they leave the historicity of the formal dichotomy
of anarchy and sovereignty untouched, circularly defined, and reified, such
projects cannot remove the basic shortcoming. For many above-mentioned
92. In other words, the reduction of regimes to objects clashes with an implicit shift to an
intersubjective ontology; see Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization," pp. 764-65.
93. For a criticism of Waltz's neorealism as unable to account for the change from the medieval
to the modern system, see the writings of John G. Ruggie: "Continuity and Transformation in the
World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 131-57;
and "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," Interna-
tional Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-74.
94. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425, and, in particular, p. 397.
95. For a thorough appraisal of the concept of sovereignty, see the writings of R. B. J. Walker;
for example, "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time," Millennium 20
(Autumn 1991), pp. 445-61.
96. See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to
Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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authors who conceptualized structural power, a dyadic power analysis points to
a nonformalistic understanding of an international system of rule beyond the
"anarchy problematique."
The static concept of structure in economic approaches also explains why
Krasner and Caporaso, although referring to the same literature, develop two
different concepts of structural power that derive from the ambiguity in
Bacharach and Baratz's approach, Krasner, starting from an intentional
choice-theoretical approach, sees current regimes as given and conceives of
power relations only where intentional attempts to change an existing regime
can be detected: the Third World against the international liberal regime
(assuming such a thing exists). Yet, regimes are not only a means (as for
Krasner) for power relations but are, as Caporaso shows, in fact effecting
exactly such power relations. Had Krasner from the beginning of his analysis
included a problematization and historization of the impersonally empowered
status quo, that is, used a dyad of concepts, this mistake would not have been
made.97 As a result, Krasner's analysis and neorealist power analysis in general
itself tend to normalize specific power relations, namely, the unvoiced power of
the status quo.
Thus, and this is the second important point, these very practices of power
analysis and power politics are part of an ongoing reshaping and reproduction
of legitimate discourses and politics. This implies that the whole power analysis
must be conceived of as an intersubjective one. Individual power, understood
as ability, is couched in an environment that is not just any objective regime or a
position in the market/balance of power but an intersubjective realm where
rituals of power continually set the stage.
It seems reasonable to expect that this impersonal empowering should be
part of any power analysis. It could not in fact coherently be part of a
choice-theoretical version of realism, of an individualist dispositional power
approach, or of any approach that objectivizes regimes, balances of power,
and/or markets.
Therefore, this power analysis, characterized by a dyad of concepts, can
claim not only to avoid some traditional logical fallacies of power concepts but
also to retain the major insights present in concepts of structural power. Its task
is not to argue that either power or governance or both are always the most
significant criteria for the explanation of an event. This is to be judged
empirically case by case. But, it makes the claim that conceptualizations that do
not unnecessarily exclude power phenomena from the construction of research
hypotheses should be preferred, because they place fewer constraints on the
answers to be found in empirical analysis.
97. For a convincing account of the dynamics of power positions that accounts for Caporaso's
and Krasner's frameworks as different stages of power institutionalizations and struggles, see John
Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 21.
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Epilogue: beyond the unquestioned plausibility of power
As I have argued, recent concepts of power have endeavored to widen the
scope of power analysis to include the three features we have met in the
conceptualization of structural power: power as indirect institutional, unin-
tended, or impersonally created effects. These attempts to use "power" to
account for an international system of governance or hierarchy or authority
highlight the insufficiencies of the concept of anarchy as it is used in traditional
IR and IPE theory. "Governance" points to the systematic understatement of
effective rule, of authority relations at the international level where the concept
of sovereignty in a system of self-help might not meaningfully matter anymore.
This has profound consequences for the articulation of neorealist theory. In a
system of self-help, the ruling of the international system is simply the result of
the clashing of national powers. The international order is made out of the
hierarchy of state forces. Therefore, in realist theory, national power(s)
become(s) the central variable in explanations. Leaving the system of self-help
to whatever a structured or functionally differentiated system entails, however,
means that power alone is no longer able to explain the "logic" of the
international system. This is the central insight of regime theory. Yet, all the
neorealist extensions of the concept of power that are aimed at preserving its
central explanatory role have been unsuccessful in integrating important
features of a comprehensive power analysis, as shown with respect to the three
meanings of structural power. Instead of increasingly widening the concept of
power, I propose a dyad of concepts, keeping power as an actor-based concept
and not subsuming governance under it. Power analysis is about that link
between agent capacities and systematic ruling and cannot be reduced to any of
them.
This kind of power analysis prepares the ground for a better understanding
of the dynamics of the international system, the political responsibilities
therein, and the possible places for change. Even governance that is impersonal
is realized via human action. The basic reason to preserve a widened power
analysis is hence an obvious emancipatory purpose that this article shares with
most structural power analyses. Although the relation between power and
governance is far from explaining every single outcome, this approach does not
exclude power phenomena a priori. Rather, it leaves the assessment of possible
short-term and long-term political action to the empirical case. The governance
of the system and its identification of powers are not taken for granted, but its
pattern of change is examined via the long-term strategies that were or were
not used to influence it. This power analysis does not deny a realm of necessity
but allows for a wider conception of political action. Particularly for realists,
who tend to believe that politics is the art of the possible, this power analysis
points to a wider realm of the possible.
This brings me to a final remark. An inherent risk haunts power analyses:
very often, power arguments are so "powerful" as to close debates. They are
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immediately plausible code words; that is, the use of a power argument is
sometimes not an explanation any longer but a substitute for one. Instead of
opening the analysis, the power argument becomes its final stroke. From being
a possible help, it becomes a hindrance to understanding. Yet, this article seeks
to show that the concept of power is neither self-evident nor unusable if
reworked systematically.
Perhaps this unquestioned plausibility of power is linked to the fact that
power politics represented a kind of general international theory. Since the
international order, rule, or system was difficult to grasp at first sight, the
distribution of power would give us the basic indication of who was responsible
for controlling that international system. Power was a shortcut. Yet, once the
realist link between agent power and international rule ceases to be clear,
power explanations do not carry the same weight as before. The dyad of
concepts makes it clear that power alone is not what we were looking for.
Power becomes just a specific "momentum" in a wider analysis of power
phenomena. In other words, power loses its function as a main theoretical
indicator.
Accordingly, the concept of power must accept a more humble place. A
concept can do no more than the theory in which it is embedded. By itself, it
does not provide such a theory. It is even less of a solution to the missing
paradigm in IR and IPE, that is, the satisfactory conceptualization of "the
international." Anarchy, system, regime, society, system of rule, and gover-
nance are all vague descriptions that hide a central vacuum in IR and IPE
theory reminiscent of the concept of the state in domestic political theory. A
conceptual analysis of power may be a way to show possible spaces for political
action and to lay bare the theoretical vacuum, but it cannot fill it.
